Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring

Yaron Azrieli

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 240-254

Abstract: A decision maker would like to delegate the acquisition of information to an expert, but is unable to observe the expert's actions, nor is she able to postpone the payment to the expert until the truth is revealed. If the expert can manipulate their report of the realized signal then incentivizing information acquisition is typically impossible. However, by hiring multiple experts and making the payments contingent on the entire vector of signals the decision maker can obtain useful information. We characterize the implementable vectors of information structures. In particular, we show that if one vector of structures is implementable then any vector of more informative structures is implementable as well.

Keywords: Implementation; Moral hazard; Information acquisition; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000069
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:240-254

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().