College admissions with tuition transfers

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 400-420

Abstract: We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tuition fees. However, the total requested tuition fees must be equal to the total payment burden on students. We introduce two mechanism classes — the first is efficient, and the second is stable and constrained efficient. Because of general incompatibilities, neither of them is strategy-proof. Next, under certain suppositions, we introduce a mechanism that is stable, strategy-proof, and Pareto dominates the deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is the best stable rule in the absence of tuition transfers. Lastly, we provide a welfare analysis to see how colleges are affected by tuition transfers.

Keywords: Tuition transfer; Mechanism; Matching; Stability; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:400-420

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.006

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