Stable cores in information graph games

Marina Núñez () and Juan Vidal-Puga

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 353-367

Abstract: In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted.

Keywords: Information graph game; Core; Stable set; Cycle-complete graph (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Stable cores in information graph games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:353-367

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.013

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