Stable cores in information graph games

Marina Núñez () and Juan Vidal-Puga

No 2020/403, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In an information graph situation, some agents that are connected by an undirected graph can share with no cost some information or technology that can also be obtained from a source. If an agent is not connected to an informed player, this agent pays a unitary cost to obtain this technology. A coalitional cost game can be defined from this situation, and the core of this game is known to be non- empty. We prove that the core of an information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the graph is cycle- complete, or equivalently if the information graph game is concave. When the graph is not cycle-complete, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. In this regard, we show that if the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, then a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related information graph situation where one edge has been deleted.

Keywords: Coalitional game; information graph; core; stable set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Stable cores in information graph games (2022)
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