The general graph matching game: Approximate core

Vijay V. Vazirani

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 132, issue C, 478-486

Abstract: The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik (1971) characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game is always non-empty, that of the general graph matching game can be empty.

Keywords: Assignment game; General graph matching game; Core; Approximate core; Transferable utility (TU) market; LP-duality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:478-486

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.017

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