Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 131, issue C, 1-28

Abstract: We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.

Keywords: Mechanisms; Interdependent types; Ex post incentive compatibility; Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Preference functions; Jury decisions; Allocation problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D70 D71 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:131:y:2022:i:c:p:1-28

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008

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