Economics at your fingertips  

A model of gradual information disclosure

Haibo Xu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 129, issue C, 238-269

Abstract: We study a dynamic game in which a financial expert seeks to optimize the utilization of her private information either by information disclosure to an investor or by self-use. The investor may be aligned or biased: an aligned investor always cooperates with the expert, whereas a biased investor may strategically betray the expert. We characterize the joint dynamics of the expert's information disclosure and the investor's type revelation and show that, by disclosing her information gradually, the expert can alleviate the hold-up effect exerted by the biased investor. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium of this game is unique. We also examine how the expert can further increase the value of her information by committing to a deadline or by committing to a particular schedule of information disclosure.

Keywords: Private information; Information disclosure; Hold-up effect; Gradualism; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2021-12-18
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:238-269