Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Claudia Cerrone (),
Yoan Hermstrüwer and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 129, issue C, 114-143
This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments – the exclusion of colluding bidders – on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to deter.
Keywords: Debarment; Collusion; Procurement auctions; Sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 D44 K21 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Debarment and Collusion in Procurement Auctions (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:114-143
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