Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun and Siyang Xiong

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 129, issue C, 181-197

Abstract: We prove that the Maskin monotonicity⁎ condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfers are made in any rationalizable profile; the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).

Keywords: Complete information; Continuous implementation; Implementation; Information perturbations; Maskin monotonicity*; Rationalizability; Social choice function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:181-197

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.001

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