Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms
Yi-Chun Chen (),
Yifei Sun () and
Siyang Xiong ()
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Yi-Chun Chen: National University of Singapore
Yifei Sun: University of International Business and Economics
Siyang Xiong: University of California, Riverside
No 5-2020, Economics and Statistics Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics
We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (by Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environ-ment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., infinite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfer is imposed on any rationalizable profile;the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbationsand continuous in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Keywords: Complete information; continuous implementation; implementation; infor-mation perturbations; Maskin monotonicity; rationalizability; social choice function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:smuesw:2020_005
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