Gender stereotypes in deliberation and team decisions

Katherine Coffman, Clio Bryant Flikkema and Olga Shurchkov

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 129, issue C, 329-349

Abstract: We explore how groups deliberate and decide on ideas in an experiment with communication. We find that gender biases play a significant role in which group members are chosen to answer on behalf of the group. Conditional on the quality of their ideas, individuals are less likely to be selected in gender incongruent domains (i.e. male-typed domains for women; female-typed domains for men). Individuals are also less likely to promote themselves when they are in the gender minority within their group. These patterns are not well-explained by objective or subjective differences in conversational behavior, nor by differences in beliefs about idea quality. Our results seem most consistent with a preference for promoting and rewarding group members in a way that conforms with gender norms.

Keywords: Gender differences; Stereotypes; Teams; Economic experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:329-349

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.004

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