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Pledge-and-review in the laboratory

Steffen Lippert and James Tremewan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 130, issue C, 179-195

Abstract: We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2021a). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast, we find that Pledge-and-Review increases efficiency in all the settings we investigate, and that the improvement is most persistent in our setting without uncertainty. Our results suggest that the Pledge-and-Review institution may be useful, even without uncertainty, as it allows conditional cooperators to test, risk free, the cooperativeness of their partners.

Keywords: Pledge and review; Public goods; Voluntary contributions; Conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C90 D02 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.003

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