Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information

Michele Gori

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 129, issue C, 350-369

Abstract: We propose a general framework to analyse how vulnerable to manipulation social choice functions are when a limited amount of information about individual preferences is available. We focus then on two properties called WMG-strategy-proofness and group WMG-strategy-proofness. A social choice function is [group] WMG-strategy-proof if it cannot be manipulated by an individual [a coalition of individuals] whose information about the preferences of the others is limited to the knowledge, for every pair of alternatives, of the number of people preferring the first alternative to the second one. We prove that there are Pareto optimal, WMG-strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social choice functions, that every Pareto optimal and WMG-strategy-proof social choice function is not anonymous if the alternatives are at least three, and that every Pareto optimal and group WMG-strategy-proof social choice function is dictatorial if the alternatives are three.

Keywords: Social choice function; Manipulability; Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; Anonymity; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825621000828
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:350-369

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.007

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().