The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action

Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 130, issue C, 384-399

Abstract: The effect of sorting students based on their academic performances depends not only on direct peer effects but also on indirect peer effects through teachers' efforts. Standard assumptions in the literature are insufficient to determine the effect of sorting on the performances of students and so are silent on the effect of policies such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs. We show that the effect of such policies depends on the curvature of teachers' marginal utility of effort. We characterize conditions under which sorting increases (decreases) the total effort of teachers and the average performance of students.

Keywords: Indirect peer effects; Tracking; Lattice structure; Matching; Supermodular comparative statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 D47 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:384-399

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.013

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