Games with second-order expected utility

Alan Beggs

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 130, issue C, 569-590

Abstract: This paper studies games when agents have second-order expected utility. It examines the theoretical predictions of the model and compares its performance in explaining behavior in experimental data on games with that of quantal response equilibrium.

Keywords: Second-order expected utility; Game theory; Probability matching; Mixed strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:569-590

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.008

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