Nonlinear pricing with finite information

Dirk Bergemann, Edmund Yeh and Jinkun Zhang

Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, vol. 130, issue C, 62-84

Abstract: We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. We consider a multi-product environment where each buyer has preferences over a d-dimensional variety of goods. The seller is limited to offering a finite number n of d-dimensional choices. The limited menu reflects a finite communication capacity between the buyer and seller.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Nonlinear pricing; Multi-dimension; Multi-product; Private information; Limited information; Quantization; Information theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information (2021)
Working Paper: Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:62-84

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.004

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