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Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility

Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Kominers and Rheingans-Yoo, Ross

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 287-294

Abstract: We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker–firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” Theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers.

Keywords: Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:287-294