Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets

Ravi Jagadeesan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 275-286

Abstract: In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf Theorem is often used to derive strategy-proofness, the deferred acceptance mechanism remains (group) strategy-proof in many infinite markets.

Keywords: Matching; Large markets; Lone wolf theorem; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:275-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015

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