The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
Leonardo Boncinelli () and
Paolo Pin ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 239-244
We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents' decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error model – where all maximal matchings are stochastically stable – while it proves effective in the agent-error model – where all and only maximum matchings are stochastically stable.
Keywords: Matching; Graph; Stochastic stability; Maximal matching; Maximum matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:239-244
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