 Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordinationSubhasish Dugar and Quazi Shahriar Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 109, issue C, 294-310 Abstract: This paper is the first to compare the efficiency-enhancing capacity of two communication protocols in experimental stag-hunt games. The traditional restricted protocol that allows communicating intentions only fails to improve efficiency over the no-communication conditions. When players are allowed to send any messages (free-form), the majority of them send messages that underscore a reason for which players should choose the efficient action. To explore further whether the absence of such a richer message in the traditional restricted communication protocol can be the cause of its ineffectiveness, we ran an additional treatment that included the intention-based message as well as a reason-based message. The data show that the richer restricted communication is as effective as free-form communication, and that reason-based messages are an effective efficiency-enhancing device in this class of coordination games regardless of whether the protocol is restricted or free-form. Keywords: Coordination game; Cheap-talk; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:294-310 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.003 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.