A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game

Dongshuang Hou, Hao Sun, Panfei Sun and Theo Driessen

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 162-169

Abstract: The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of game through a decomposition method for this game into unanimity cost games, exploiting the linearity of the Shapley value. Second, we characterize the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game by applying the so-called collective balanced contributions property, meaning that for any two airplanes from two different airlines, the withdrawal of one airline leads to the same loss to the airplane in the other.

Keywords: Shapley value; Airport cost pooling game; Characterization; Collective balanced contributions property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:162-169

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.007

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