A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

Rabah Amir () and Igor V. Evstigneev

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 109, issue C, 99-103

Abstract: The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature.

Keywords: Price competition; Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Weakly dominated strategy; Non-monotonic demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A New Look at the Classical Bertrand Duopoly (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:99-103

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010

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