A New Look at the Classical Bertrand Duopoly

Rabah Amir () and Igor V. Evstigneev

Economics Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester

Abstract: The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature.

JEL-codes: C72 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Journal Article: A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:sespap:1702

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