The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index

Ori Haimanko ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 391-400

Abstract: I introduce a new axiom for power indices on the domain of finite simple games that requires the total power of any given pair i,j of players in any given game v to be equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some single player k in some game w. I show that the Banzhaf power index is uniquely characterized by this new “equivalence to individual power” axiom in conjunction with the standard semivalue axioms: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, positivity (which is strengthened to avoid zeroing-out of the index on some games), and dummy.

Keywords: Simple games; Banzhaf power index; Semivalues; 2-efficiency; Superadditivity; Transfer; Symmetry; Positivity; Dummy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: THE AXIOM OF EQUIVALENCE TO INDIVIDUAL POWER AND THE BANZHAF INDEX (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:391-400

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.003

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