Economics at your fingertips  

Membership separability: A new axiomatization of the Shapley value

Geoffroy de Clippel ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 125-129

Abstract: The paper shows that Shapley's axiomatic characterization of his value can be strengthened considerably. Indeed, his additivity axiom can be replaced by a simple accounting property whereby a player's payoff is the difference of a reward based on the worth of coalitions to which she belongs, and a tax based on the worth of coalition to which she does not belong, without placing any restriction whatsoever on the functional relationship between the reward or the tax and the worths that determine them.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Shapley value; Axioms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.004

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:125-129