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A universal construction generating potential games

Nikolai Kukushkin

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 331-340

Abstract: Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain “facilities.” All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a “trimness” condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games with structured utilities, all facilities are trim. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.

Keywords: Potential game; Congestion game; Game with structured utilities; Game of social interactions; Additive aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: A universal construction generating potential games (2016) Downloads
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