A universal construction generating potential games

Nikolai Kukushkin (ququns@inbox.ru)

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain "facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a regularity condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; both congestion games and games with structured utilities are included in the class and satisfy that condition. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.

Keywords: Potential game; Congestion game; Game with structured utilities; Game of social interactions; Additive aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A universal construction generating potential games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71664

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