Values for environments with externalities – The average approach

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, vol. 108, issue C, 49-64

Abstract: We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the λ-egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.

Keywords: Externalities; Sharing the surplus; Average approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: VALUES FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES – THE AVERAGE APPROACH (2016)
Working Paper: Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:49-64

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.003

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