Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein ()

No 6002, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players’ set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the ë-egalitarian Shapley value, and the least-square family. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.

Keywords: externalities; sharing the surplus; average approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Related works:
Journal Article: Values for environments with externalities – The average approach (2018)
Working Paper: VALUES FOR ENVIRONMENTS WITH EXTERNALITIES – THE AVERAGE APPROACH (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6002

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