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Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality

Francesca Barigozzi and Helmuth Cremer

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 144, issue C, 250-283

Abstract: We study how workers' concern for coworkers' ability (CfCA) affects competition in the labor market. Two firms offer nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms may differ in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous in their ability (high or low) and their taste for being employed by any of the two firms. Workers receive a utility premium when employed by the firm hiring most high-ability workers and suffer a utility loss if hired by its competitor. These premiums/losses are endogenously determined.

Keywords: Concern for coworkers' quality; Competition; Screening; Sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L13 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers’ quality (2024) Downloads
Working Paper: Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Shining with the Stars: Competition, Screening, and Concern for Coworkers' Quality (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality (2021) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:144:y:2024:i:c:p:250-283

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.014

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