Two experiments on trading information goods in a network

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yutaka Kayaba, Jun Maekawa and Hitoshi Matsushima

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 145, issue C, 1-18

Abstract: We examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in a network experimentally. A cycle path in a network allows a buyer to become a reseller who can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. A theoretical prediction considers that the price of the information good, even with the first transaction where there is not yet a reseller competing with the original seller, will be lower in networks with a cycle path than otherwise. However, our experiment reveals that the observed price for the first transaction is significantly higher in networks with a cycle path. An additional experiment that enhances competition also does not support the theoretical prediction.

Keywords: Information good; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Two Experiments on Trading Information Goods in a Network (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:1-18

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.002

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