Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs

Hlafo Alfie Mimun, Matteo Quattropani and Marco Scarsini

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 145, issue C, 239-262

Abstract: We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p∈[0,1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p and is i.i.d. from the same uniform distribution with probability 1−p. This model interpolates the model of i.i.d. random payoff used in most of the literature and the model of random potential games. First we study the number of pure Nash equilibria in the above class of games. Then we show that, for any positive p, asymptotically in the number of available actions, best response dynamics reaches a pure Nash equilibrium with high probability.

Keywords: Pure Nash equilibrium; Random games; Potential games; Best response dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Best-Response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:239-262

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.011

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