Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values

Enrico De Magistris

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 144, issue C, 126-140

Abstract: I propose a notion of Rationalizability, called Incomplete Preference Rationalizability, for games with incomplete preferences. Under an appropriate topological condition, the incomplete preference rationalizable set is non-empty and compact. I argue that incomplete orderings can be used to model incomplete information in strategic settings. Drawing on this connection, I show that in games with private values the sets of incomplete preference rationalizable actions, of belief-free rationalizable actions (Battigalli et al., 2011; Bergemann and Morris, 2017), and of interim correlated rationalizable actions (Dekel et al., 2007) of the universal type space coincide.

Keywords: Game theory; Rationalizability; Incomplete preferences; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:144:y:2024:i:c:p:126-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.003

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