Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks

Sean M. Collins and Duncan James

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 145, issue C, 117-136

Abstract: Highest stoppage games in economics—first price sealed bid auction and Dutch auction, among others—have produced striking puzzles, including violation of revenue equivalence between auctions and adjustment of behavior across interfaces. The latter is also observed in risk elicitation. Here, we use existing puzzles to shed light on each other, by nesting auction and risk tasks in a common environment. We find behavior consistent with a spatial interface imparting the same relevant auction-theoretic surplus and probability information as does an interactive numerical calculation tool. Empirical revenue equivalence (respectively, risky choice) can thus be altered by design.

Keywords: Information; Choice under risk; Auctions; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:117-136

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.005

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