Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass

Adam Tauman Kalai and Ehud Kalai

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 144, issue C, 378-394

Abstract: Strategic interactions pose central issues that are not adequately explained by the traditional concepts of dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), Nash equilibrium (NE), and their refinements. A comprehensive analysis of equilibrium concepts within the von Neumann-Nash framework of n-person optimization reveals a decreasing hierarchy of n nested concepts ranging from DSE to NE. These concepts are defined by the “critical mass,” the number of players needed to adopt and sustain the play of a strategy profile as an equilibrium. In games with n>2 players, the n−2 intermediate concepts explain strategic issues in large social systems, implementation, decentralization, as well as replication studied in economics, operations management, and political games.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Dominant strategy equilibrium; Faulty players; Social contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:144:y:2024:i:c:p:378-394

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.011

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