Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

Ori Haimanko ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 146, issue C, 222-233

Abstract: We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Incomplete information; Behavioral strategies; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Interdependent types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:146:y:2024:i:c:p:222-233

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007

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