Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets

Esteban Peralta

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 146, issue C, 51-58

Abstract: It is well known that in the absence of transfers, stable matchings are positive assortative when agents' preferences are strictly monotonic in each other's types and types are commonly known. Instead, monotonicity is consistent with the existence of stable matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one side of the market are private information. This paper sheds light on the scope and meaning of this consistency by showing that within familiar monotonic markets we cannot conclude that a stable matching is negative, and not positive, assortative.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Sorting; Stable matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000575
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:146:y:2024:i:c:p:51-58

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.008

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().