Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity

Ran I. Shorrer and Sándor Sóvágó

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 144, issue C, 167-182

Abstract: College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.

Keywords: College admissions; Dominated strategies; Market design; Preference misrepresentation; School choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D47 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:144:y:2024:i:c:p:167-182

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002

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