Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
Wonki Cho ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 168-177
We study three incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms: (i) strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by misrepresenting his preferences; (ii) adjacent strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent gain by switching the rankings of two adjacent alternatives; and (iii) mistake monotonicity, which requires that the welfare of each agent weakly decrease as he reports increasingly bigger mistakes. Each of these properties has three versions, depending on whether preferences over sure alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries by the stochastic dominance, downward lexicographic, or upward lexicographic extension. We identify conditions on the preference domain that guarantee the equivalence of these properties. The universal domain and the domains of single-dipped and single-peaked preferences satisfy our conditions.
Keywords: Ordinal mechanism; Strategy-proofness; Adjacent strategy-proofness; Mistake monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:168-177
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