Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo

Patrick Harless

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 73-87

Abstract: Working in the Arrowian framework, we search for preference aggregation rules with desirable solidarity properties. In a fixed-population setting, we formulate two versions of the solidarity axiom welfare dominance under preference replacement. Although the stronger proves incompatible with efficiency, the combination of efficiency and our second version leads to an important class of rules which improve upon a “status quo” order. These rules are also strategy-proof, which reveals a further connection between solidarity and incentive properties. Allowing the population to vary, we again characterize the status quo rules by efficiency and a different solidarity axiom, population monotonicity. This extends a similar characterization of a subclass of these rules by Bossert and Sprumont (2014).

Keywords: Welfare dominance under preference replacement; Preference aggregation; Status quo rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:73-87

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.009

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