Objective and subjective compliance: A norm-based explanation of ‘moral wiggle room’

Kai Spiekermann and Arne Weiss

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 96, issue C, 170-183

Abstract: We propose a cognitive-dissonance model of norm compliance to identify conditions for selfishly biased information acquisition. The model distinguishes between objective norm compliers, for whom the right action is a function of the state of the world, and subjective norm compliers, for whom it is a function of their belief. The former seek as much information as possible; the latter acquire only information that lowers, in expected terms, normative demands. The source of ‘moral wiggle room’ is not belief manipulation, but the coarseness of normative prescriptions under conditions of uncertainty. In a novel experimental setup, we find evidence for such strategic information uptake. Our results suggest that attempts to change behavior by subjecting individuals to norms can lead to biased information acquisition instead of compliance.

Keywords: Norm compliance; Uncertainty; Experiment; Self-serving biases; Strategic learning; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:170-183

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.007

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