Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences

Jian Li and Junjie Zhou

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 96, issue C, 18-29

Abstract: Blackwell (1951, 1953) proposes an informativeness ranking of experiments: experiment I is more Blackwell-informative than experiment II if and only if the value of experiment I is higher than that of experiment II for all expected-utility maximizers. Under commitment and reduction, our main theorem shows that Blackwell equivalence holds for all convex and strongly monotone preferences—i.e., uncertainty-averse preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011b), which nest most ambiguity-averse preferences commonly used in applications as special cases.

Keywords: Blackwell's theorem; Garbling; Ambiguity aversion; Value of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:18-29

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.009

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