Participation in moral hazard problems

Guillaume Roger

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 10-24

Abstract: Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related and non-monotonic in the agent's transport cost and so in market structures; they increase (decrease) with competition. Uncertainty as to the agent's location may increase or decrease the rent compared to full information. This correspondingly harms or benefits principals.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Asymmetric information; Contract; Participation constraint; Principal–agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:10-24

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.005

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