Spatial implementation

Richard L. Brady and Christopher Chambers

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, vol. 94, issue C, 200-205

Abstract: In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we introduce a new rule, the geometric median, and characterize it as the smallest rule (with respect to set inclusion) satisfying a collection of axioms. The geometric median is independent of the choice of coordinates and is Nash implementable.

Keywords: Geometric median; Euclidean preferences; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:94:y:2015:i:c:p:200-205

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011

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