Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes

Shohei Tamura

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 41-46

Abstract: We study the problem of selecting prize winners from a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such rules. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up.

Keywords: Institutional design; Award rules; Conflict of interest; Impartiality; Plurality correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:41-46

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.005

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