Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible

Vikram Manjunath and Bertan Turhan

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 25-40

Abstract: When groups of schools within a single district run their admission processes independently of one another, the resulting match is often inefficient: many children are left unmatched and seats are left unfilled.

Keywords: School choice; Deferred acceptance; Decentralized matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:25-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004

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