Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
Stergios Athanasoglou
Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 156-167
Abstract:
Suppose a group of agents submit strict linear orderings over a set of alternatives. An aggregation rule is a function mapping this information into a unique social ordering. In a recent paper, Bossert and Sprumont (2014) introduced betweenness-based notions of efficiency and strategyproofness for aggregation rules and identified three broad classes of rules which satisfy them. The current paper suggests that such betweenness-based requirements may at times be too weak and introduces stronger concepts based on Kemeny distances, namely K-efficiency and K-strategyproofness. When there are three alternatives, all Condorcet–Kemeny rules are both K-efficient and K-strategyproof for a large subdomain of profiles. Moreover, all status-quo rules are K-strategyproof, though not K-efficient. When the number of alternatives exceeds three none of the rules discussed by Bossert and Sprumont satisfies K-strategyproofness, while just Condorcet–Kemenyrules satisfy K-efficiency. The existence of a nondictatorial and onto K-strategyproof rule is an open question.
Keywords: Aggregation rule; Strategyproofness; Efficiency; Kemeny distance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:156-167
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.002
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