Smug Alert! Exploring self-licensing behavior in a cheating game

Sophie Clot, Gilles Grolleau () and Lisette Ibanez

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 191-194

Abstract: We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

Keywords: Self-licensing; Behavioral experiment; Prosocial preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:191-194

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.039

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