Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability

Monique M.H. Pollmann, Jan Potters and Stefan Trautmann

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 387-390

Abstract: We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion. Differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision (“ex-ante”) and where they are accountable for the outcome (“ex-post”).

Keywords: Decision under risk; Decisions of agents; Accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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Working Paper: Risk taking by agents: The role of ex-ante and ex-post accountability (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:387-390

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.004

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