Personality and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games

John Kagel and Peter McGee

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 2, 274-277

Abstract: We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait Agreeableness. A one standard deviation increase in agreeableness increases the predicted probability of cooperation by a subject with modal demographic characteristics from 67.9% to 80.6%.

Keywords: Finitely repeated prisoner dilemma; Personality; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:274-277

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.034

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